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Abstract: In this paper we investigate denial of service (DoS) vulnerabilities in Voice over IP (VoIP) systems, focusing
on the ITU-T H.323 family of protocols. We provide a simple characterisation of DoS attacks that allows us to
readily identify DoS issues in H.323 protocols. We also discuss network layer DoS vulnerabilities that affect
VoIP systems. A number of improvements and further research directions are proposed.
1 INTRODUCTION
The telephony service is an integral part of the op-
eration of the vast majority of organisations. Provid-
ing and operating highly reliable systems is a signif-
icant engineering challenge requiring skilled design,
critical component redundancy and a highly available
maintenance capability. Ensuring the availability of
the telephony service when voice and data are shared
over IP networks and in the face of malicious adver-
saries makes this challenge all the more demanding.
The distinct nature of threats to availability pre-
sented by Denial of Service (DoS) attacks have been
known for some time (Needham, 1994). It is impor-
tant to note that the goal of a DoS attack is not to
gain unauthorised access to a machine or data, but
to prevent legitimate users accessing a service. DoS
prevention continues to be an active area of research,
especially in the context of Internet protocols (Aura,
2000; Schuba et al., 1997). There is, however, a clear
lack of DoS literature specific to IP telephony.
The main contribution of this paper is the identi-
fication and analysis of vulnerabilities in Voice over
IP (VoIP) systems that may result in denial of service
when maliciously exploited by individuals. We focus
our attention on the ITU-T H.323 family of protocols
for VoIP. Some familiarity with the standards is as-
sumed from the reader; in particular Recommenda-
tions H.323 (ITU-T, 2003c), H.225 (ITU-T, 2003a),
H.245 (ITU-T, 2003b) and H.235 (ITU-T, 2003d), as
well as IPv4 protocols.
Different classifications of DoS attacks can be
found in the literature (e.g. (Aura, 2000; Millen,
1992; Center, 1997; Leiwo et al., 2000)), however
they are not entirely suitable for our purpose of iden-
tifying DoS vulnerabilities in VoIP protocols. In Sec-
tion 2 we present a characterisation of host behaviours
that may indicate DoS vulnerabilities. This character-
isation leads to a simple classification of DoS attacks.
In Section 3, we discuss denial of service threats to
H.323 VoIP systems that exploit IP or network layer
vulnerabilities. Sections 4 and 5 investigate vulner-
abilities that relate to specific H.323 protocol mes-
sages, with and without the optional security services
defined in Recommendation H.235. For each of the
most commonly used messages we classify their DoS
behaviour according to the criteria described in Sec-
tion 2. We discuss the effectiveness of the crypto-
graphic authentication mechanisms defined in H.235
in mitigating DoS threats. In Section 6, we suggest
research directions that may improve H.235 authenti-
cation mechanisms. Throughout the paper we provide
various recommendations to assist in alleviating the
identified DoS issues. To the best of our knowledge,
this paper presents the first comprehensive study of
DoS vulnerabilities in H.323 based VoIP systems.
2 CLASSIFICATION OF DoS
ATTACKS
A general way of distinguishing between different
types of DoS attacks is to separate them into flooding
and non-flooding (or logical) attacks. A logical attack
results in a denial of service through exploiting a vul-
nerability in the logic or syntax of processing. A pro-
cess is forced or induced to perform an action that is
inconsistent with the correct operation of the system.
To illustrate, consider a logical attack example from
the H.323 domain; an attacker sends forged H.225
RAS unregistration request messages (URQ) for tar-
geted endpoints to the Gatekeeper. Once they are un-
registered, the endpoints cannot make or receive calls.
If the protocol design allows the gatekeeper to act on
unauthenticated unregistration requests, a logical at-
tack vulnerability exists since an attacker can easily
forge them.
Cryptography provides useful authentication and
integrity techniques to avoid logical attacks. It is
theoretically possible to eliminate denial of service
vulnerabilities based on logical attacks through ap-
propriate protocol design and careful implementation.
However a design that is immune from logical attacks
may be more susceptible to flooding attacks. The
inter-relationship exists because the protections that
ensure that a process will not act on a forged or altered
message require the process to perform calculations
to assess message integrity. The calculations require
additional time and effort. By sending the process bo-
gus messages, the attacker consumes finite processing
resources of the target with a minimal commitment of
its own.
There is an asymmetry between the minimal ef-
fort required of the attacker to commit the receiving
process to a much greater amount of work. If the at-
tacker can access sufficient bandwidth to send a large
number of unauthentic messages, the process’s ca-
pacity to authenticate them can be overwhelmed to
the point where legitimate requests cannot be handled
in a timely fashion. Denial of service results. Once
again, using the example of a H.323 gatekeeper, the
attacker could send a constant, high volume stream
of forged H.225 RAS admission request (ARQ) mes-
sages. These forged messages include bogus integrity
protection data. They will fail the integrity check and
be discarded. Nonetheless, legitimate requests for ad-
mission will be swamped in the flood of forged re-
quests.
To avoid this problem the process must be able to
authenticate messages at the highest possible rate that
they could arrive, i.e. the message processing capac-
ity must be matched to the message carrying capacity
(bandwidth) of the connection. With the growth in
network bandwidth currently outstripping the growth
in processing power, this is an increasingly difficult
balancing act. It also results in the over-engineering
of processing capacity, a potentially inefficient allo-
cation of resources, since the message handling capa-
bility may far exceed the requirements of legitimate
traffic.
The overhead of cryptographic message integrity
protection only exacerbates the imbalance. There is
no simple solution to this issue. Logical attacks that
exploit unauthenticated messages are powerful and
highly effective. Flooding attacks that consume all
processing and storage resources are powerful and
highly effective. There are however some promising
general approaches to address this apparent conflict,
which we discuss in Section 6.
We can further classify DoS attacks based on the
behaviour of hosts in response to incoming proto-
col messages (requests) that makes attacks feasible.
Our approach, contrary to others (Aura, 2000; Millen,
1992; Center, 1997; Leiwo et al., 2000), is thus host
centric, avoids modelling the unpredictable nature of
attackers, and allows us to readily identify potential
DoS vulnerabilities in protocols. The attacks with an
intent to flood will be classified under Class F and that
of non-flooding attacks under Class NF.
2.1 Flooding Attacks
The behaviour leading to flooding attacks can be clas-
sified based on the amount of computation required
for the response computation. The classification is as
follows:
• F.C1: the host performs response computations for
unauthenticated requests;
• F.C2: the host performs response computations for
authenticated requests;
• F.S1: the host accepts large request sizes;
• F.S2: the host sends large response sizes;
Every behaviour of the host that is of type F.C1
could be a potential denial of service vulnerability.
Therefore, the response computation with behaviour
type F.C1 must be as small as possible to prevent
flooding attacks. Also, the number of procedures
in the system that have behaviour type F.C1 must
be minimal. These observations are crucial because
the attacker will essentially remain unidentified and
therefore cannot be blacklisted. In other words, it is
impossible to control access to network services that
possess behaviour type F.C1.
It can be seen that every host that provides some
form of network service will provide at least one ser-
vice with behaviour type F.C1. Consider the pro-
cess that authenticates the requests. The requests to
the authentication process are essentially unauthenti-
cated. Only the responses of the authentication pro-
cess may be authenticated. Therefore the authenticat-
ing behaviour is of type F.C1. Clearly the authenti-
cation procedure that authenticates the requests must
perform small response computations.
Procedures with behaviour type F.C2 will also be
susceptible to flooding attacks. But, due to the as-
sumption that such procedures respond only to au-
thenticated requests, it may be possible to protect the
host from its protocol peer. Note that the behaviour
type of the procedure for authenticating requests is
F.C1. So, care must be taken to design a request au-
thenticating procedure that performs small response
computations.
Procedures with behaviour type (F.S1, F.C1) must
be avoided because large request sizes require more
computation than small request sizes. Procedures
with behaviour type (F.S2, F.C1) must also be avoided
because such procedures can be used as amplifiers to
attack other hosts on the network.
2.2 Non-Flooding Attacks
The behaviour leading to non-flooding attacks can be
classified based on the decision making behaviour of
the host’s response computation. Attackers employ
non-flooding attacks to force the victim host to make
incorrect decisions. The following are the classifica-
tion of behaviour that may lead to non-flooding at-
tacks:
• NF.UA: the response computation of the host
makes crucial decisions when an unauthenticated
request arrives;
• NF.A: the response computation of the host makes
crucial decisions only on the arrival of authenti-
cated requests;
Behaviour NF.UA poses the biggest risk of denial
of service attacks. To mitigate the threat of DoS due
to NF.UA behaviour authentication mechanisms can
be applied. Even then, denial of service may occur
when the authenticated peer misbehaves. Examples
of behaviour type NF.UA include the H.225.0 RAS
Unregistration (URQ) request and the H.225.0 Q.931
Release Complete message.
3 NETWORK LEVEL
VUNERABILITIES FOR H.323
ENTITIES
In this section we discuss denial of service threats
to H.323 VoIP systems that exploit network layer vul-
nerabilities. The focus is on the impact of IP denial of
service attacks on H.323 system availability. Table 1
present a partial list of known DoS vulnerabilities in
IPv4. We do not exhaustively review the details of
each attack.
Each component of an H.323 VoIP system (termi-
nals, multipoint controller units, gateways and gate-
keepers) uses TCP and UDP protocols with both fixed
and dynamically assigned port numbers. Since an
Protocol Message Classification
IP Fragment Datagram F.C1
ICMP Destination Unreachable F.C1
Time Exceeded NF.UA
Source Quench NF.UA
Redirect F.C1, NF.UA
Echo F.C1
TCP SYN F.C1
RST / FIN NF.UA
RIP Responses NF.UA
CDP Neighbor announcements F.C1
DNS Name server queries F.C1, F.S1
Name server responses NF.UA
Table 1: DoS vulnerability classification of IPv4.
H.323 VoIP system employs the full suite of IP pro-
tocols, it inherits the complete set of IP vulnerabili-
ties. The more important vulnerabilities are now sum-
marised.
• ICMP Source Quench: can be used to degrade
the quality of a media channel by effectively reduc-
ing its bandwidth. The attacker masquerades as a
router and sends ICMP source quench messages to
an upstream router on the media stream path to re-
duce the packet flow rate coming from the targeted
router.
• ICMP Redirect: messages can be sent by an at-
tacker to dynamically alter routing tables in hosts.
Since the source is not authenticated, redirect mes-
sages can be used in a flooding attack if the update
process is computationally resource intensive, as is
the case on a number of Windows platforms.
• TCP SYN Flood: the SYN flood (Bernstein, 1996)
is a powerful attack that can be directed at a num-
ber of listening ports on H.323 devices. It is imple-
mented in the majority of denial of service attack
tools. The attack exploits the fact that the TCP pro-
tocol allocates memory to store protocol state on
the basis of unauthenticated requests.
• TCP RST and FIN: because the source of TCP
packets is not authenticated, an attacker can send
RST and FIN packets to terminate TCP connec-
tions (Harris and Hunt, 1999). H.225.0 call con-
trol and H.245 media control channels could be tar-
geted. Knowledge of TCP sequence numbers is re-
quired. An attacker can monitor a TCP connection
to access the sequence number via: an ARP poison-
ing attack in the case of switched Ethernet; through
an interface device running in promiscuous mode
in the case of broadcast Ethernet; or through com-
promising an intermediate router.
It is difficult to say whether in general terms, appli-
cation or network layer denial of service vulnerabili-
ties pose a greater threat. While a general ranking is
not possible due to individual variations in the local
threat environment, it is clear that IP-based denial of
service attacks present a high level of risk in an H.323
context for a number of reasons:
• the proliferation and broad availability of sophisti-
cated, user friendly IP DoS attack tools;
• as the attacks target the network layer, attackers
do not need to investigate the details of the H.323
family of protocols. Consequently, the time cost in
preparing an attack is low and very little specialised
H.323 knowledge is required;
• the extensive use of dynamically negotiated, high-
numbered protocol ports makes it difficult to apply
best-practice, restrictive firewall rule sets. H.323
components are therefore, more difficult to protect;
• registered H.323 ports present an attractive packet
flooding attack target as their values are fixed and
published;
• the critical functions performed by the Gatekeeper
make it an attractive flooding attack target. The op-
eration of an entire zone can be affected by attacks
that target the gatekeeper, e.g. attacks directed at
the Gatekeeper uni-cast RAS port can block end-
point registration requests and call admission re-
quests1;
• the Gatekeeper is difficult to protect because its
functions typically require communication with de-
vices on remote (potentially) untrusted networks;
Many network layer vulnerabilities are addressed
in the latest version of the Internet Protocol, IPv6.
3.1 Source Address Spoofing
A number of network layer attacks employ source ad-
dress spoofing, either to enhance the effectiveness of
the attack, or as a required element. For example,
SYN, UDP and ICMP floods are more difficult to re-
spond to and are therefore more effective when source
spoofing is used, as the typical reaction technique
of blocking based on source address will not work.
An attack that uses forged ICMP source quench mes-
sages to reduce the throughput of time-critical media
streams requires source address spoofing. The smurf
attack2 also requires the ability to spoof source ad-
dresses.
1If a gatekeeper cannot receive call admission requests,
endpoints cannot receive or initiate calls.
2In the smurf attack, a request is sent to a broadcast ad-
dress with the forged source address of the attack target. All
hosts in the broadcast domain respond to the forged source
address, generating a flood of traffic directed at the target.
Experience has shown that source address spoof-
ing is a significant problem on the public Internet. It
also presents a threat in the context of attacks confined
to private IP networks. However, in private networks
different mitigation strategies are possible. One such
strategy involves segmenting a private network into a
number of IP subnets that are connected by layer 3
devices implementing egress filtering. This strategy
filters out packets where the network portion of the
source address is spoofed. Preventing forgery of the
host portion of a source IP address is a considerably
more difficult problem to solve.
In any case, the elimination of source address
forgery only prevents a subset of attacks. Network
and application layer flooding attacks are still pos-
sible, though identification of the offender is trivial.
Being able to identify the source of a traffic flood is
only useful if this allows some form of response. For
example, router or firewall rules can be dynamically
updated to filter packets from that source. To be ef-
fective, swift detection and reaction are required. If
there is no dynamically reconfigurable filter between
the target and the source of the traffic flood, as is the
case when attacker and attacked are in the same trans-
port network domain, it appears that the target must
defend itself.
3.2 Self Defense
If VoIP services are to be provided reliably, H.323
entities must be capable of identifying and reacting
to denial of service attacks in a timely manner. The
typical response strategy involves filtering the flood
traffic. Filtering traffic at the physical layer offers ef-
ficiency advantages over network or application level
filters as the malicious packets can be dropped before
any higher layer processing resources are consumed.
Using a MAC address black-list, the physical layer
can drop malicious packets as quickly as they arrive.
More research is needed to investigate how in-
trusion detection concepts (DoS identification) could
be integrated with physical layer filtering (DoS re-
sponse). We briefly describe this approach in the
context of a UDP flood. Assume that a number of
hosts are directing a UDP flood attack at listening
UDP ports on a Gatekeeper that resides on the same
segment. An IDS application detects the flood traf-
fic, noting the source IP addresses. Using a trans-
port layer API, the IDS places a blocking request
for those IP addresses. The transport layer resolves
the IP to MAC address mapping and includes the
relevant MAC addresses in a black-list. The gate-
keeper’s transport layer stops passing IP packets ar-
riving in Ethernet frames with with the black-listed
source MAC address up to the network layer. The
performance of network and application layers is no
longer affected by the flood.
It is clearly important that MAC addresses cannot
be spoofed 3. Were this not the case, the defence
mechanism itself could be used to launch a denial of
service attack by forging the MAC address of the real
target, thereby having it black-listed. Certain MAC
addresses should not be blockable, including those of
router interfaces, otherwise all traffic coming from the
router will be blocked. Where the flood traffic is com-
ing from a router interface, the targeted host needs a
way of notifying that router that it would like traf-
fic with a nominated source IP address and the host’s
destination IP address, blocked. If the source MAC of
the malicious traffic is blockable, the router adds the
address to its blacklist, otherwise it sends a similar
request to another router, the source of the traffic.
This approach appears to offer some promising fea-
tures, facilitating adaptive defense in the context of
private IP networks.
4 APPLICATION LEVEL
VULNERABILITIES IN H.323
WITHOUT H.235
We will first consider the scenario where the H.323
protocol stacks do not implement the H.235 standard.
To be more precise, we first consider the protocol
stacks that do not possess any form of request authen-
tication during the signalling phase. Subsequently,
the protocol stacks that implement the H.235 stan-
dard are investigated. It should be noted that some
of the attacks described here may be dependent upon
the implementor’s interpretation of the H.323-related
standards.
4.1 H.225.0 RAS Messages
Recommendation H.225.0 specifies the Registration,
Admission and Status (RAS) signalling protocol.
RAS messages are transmitted between gatekeepers
and end-points over an unreliable protocol such as
UDP. RAS allows a gatekeeper to manage endpoints
within its zone. Table 2 summarises DoS vulnerabili-
ties found in RAS messages. RAS protocol messages
are stateless in the sense that an entity could receive
any RAS message at any time. H.323 entities must
maintain an internal state in relation to requests and
responses (confirm or reject). This behaviour leads
to almost all RAS messages being suitable candidates
for flooding type attacks.
3To address this problem, some Ethernet switches al-
low each port to be associated with a fixed MAC address.
Changing the MAC address to port binding requires admin-
istrative access to the switch.
RAS Message Classification
Gatekeeper discovery GRQ F.C1
Registration RRQ F.C1
Unregistration URQ F.C1, NF.UA
Admission ARQ F.C1
Bandwidth change BRQ F.C1, NF.UA
Location LRQ F.C1
Disengage DRQ F.C1
Status IRQ F.C1, F.S1, F.S2
IRR F.C1, F.S2
Table 2: DoS classification of RAS messages.
When the response computation performed by the
host (terminal or the gatekeeper) is large, then the par-
ticular response computation (and thereby the gate-
keeper) can be overloaded by flooding the host with
many request messages. Since messages are unau-
thenticated, it may be difficult to black-list the at-
tacker, who is unidentified.
The messages IRQ and IRR could potentially be
susceptible to DoS if the behaviour of the gatekeeper
or the terminal falls under classification F.S2. If a
large response is generated by a response computa-
tion with behaviour F.C1, then these messages can be
used to flood other terminals in the network. That is,
the gatekeeper or the terminal with behaviour (F.C1,
F.S2) can be used as amplifiers to attack other hosts
in the network.
The messages URQ and BRQ could also pose a
denial of service risk of type NF.UA if they could
be spoofed. For example, an attacker can manufac-
ture an unregistration request with knowledge of the
targeted terminal’s IP address and RAS port num-
ber. If the gatekeeper acts on the request, the terminal
will be unable to make or receive calls until it is re-
registered.Similarly, if bandwidth request messages
can be fabricated, it may be possible to cause a denial
of service by an attacker causing the gatekeeper to al-
locate all of the available bandwidth to non-existent
calls. This type of attack could also be used to send a
fabricated reject message to an endpoint in response
to a valid request message, causing the endpoint to in-
correctly believe that a requested service is not avail-
able.
4.2 H.225.0 (Q.93x) Messages
The call signalling channel (H.225.0/Q.931/Q.932)
messages are transmitted between endpoints and/or
between endpoints and gatekeepers (depending on the
routing model). They allow the establishment and
tear-down of connections between endpoints. A re-
liable protocol such as TCP is used for the transport
of H.225.0 call signalling messages. A number of the
messages are susceptible to various DoS activity, as
summarised in Table 3.
H.225.0 (Q.93x) Message Classification
Setup F.C1, F.S2
Facility NF.UA
ReleaseComplete NF.UA
CallProceeding NF.UA
Alerting NF.UA
Connect F.S2, NF.UA
Table 3: DoS classification of H.225.0 (Q.93x).
H.323 entities must always be prepared to receive
an incoming Setup message (if they want to re-
ceive incoming calls!). Thus, there is the potential for
flooding an entity on the port on which it listens for
connections. Since an entity receiving a setup mes-
sage performs a relatively large amount of processing
and responds with several messages, there is also the
potential for attacks of type F.S2.
As with the RAS messages, there is also the poten-
tial for spoofed messages to wreak havoc with entities
communicating over the call signalling channel (vul-
nerabilities of classification NF.UA). For example,
ReleaseComplete could be abused to prematurely
terminate a call. A fabricated Connect message,
sent prior to being expected, could cause the calling
endpoint to initiate call control messages to which the
receiver would not be prepared to respond. A sim-
ilar approach might be successful for Facility ,
CallProceeding and Alerting messages.
4.3 H.245 Messages
Recommendation H.245 specifies a control protocol
for managing multimedia bearer streams. An H.245
channel must be carried over reliable transport, either
on an individual TCP connection or tunnelled through
an H.225.0 call control channel. H.245 specifies four
classes of messages:
1. Request: entities send request messages for spe-
cific actions. Every request message requires an
immediate response message;
2. Response: entities receiving a request message are
required to return the corresponding response mes-
sage;
3. Command: commands initiate a mandatory action
but require no response;
4. Indication: entities send an indication message
when no specific action or response message is re-
quired.
Command messages are of the greatest interest in
terms of their capacity for misuse resulting in de-
nial of service. H.245 commands force the receiv-
ing terminal to perform an action related to the con-
trol of media streams. Where no integrity protection
or source authentication services are provided, the
H.245 commands have the potential for serious de-
nial of service consequences as command messages
can be forged or modified and the receiving terminal
must perform the required action. The scope of ser-
vice denial is limited to the disruption of calls that are
in in the process of being established or currently in
progress.
H.245 Command Messages Classification
SendTerminalCapabilitySet F.S2
FlowControlCommand NF.UA, F.S2
EndSessionCommand NF.UA
MiscellaneousCommand NF.UA
ConferenceCommand NF.UA
H223Multiplex
Reconfiguration NF.UA
NewATMVCommand NF.UA
MobileMultilink
ReconfigurationCommand NF.UA
Table 4: DoS characteristics of H.245 commands.
Table 4 lists the H.245 commands that have poten-
tial denial of service consequences when H.235 in-
tegrity protection is not implemented. NF.UA indi-
cates a non-flooding attack based on an unauthenti-
cated message. The following commands are of par-
ticular note:
• SendTerminalCapability: when sent as a
genericRequest this command requires the re-
ceiving terminal to send its entire terminal capabil-
ity set. Since the response is potentially large, this
command may be used as an amplifier.
• FlowControlCommand: issued by one termi-
nal to instruct another terminal to restrict the bit-
rate for a logical channel to the specified value, i.e.
“don’t send data any faster than x”. The receiving
terminal must comply. If the specified value is not
compatible with the codec being used, the terminal
must stop sending data on that logical channel so
denial of service results when a flow control limit
is set at a smaller value than the lowest bit-rate the
codec supports.
• EndSessionCommand: instructs the other ter-
minal to immediately cease sending H.245 mes-
sages. Denial of service results as the call is effec-
tively terminated without an H.245 control channel.
• MiscellaneousCommand: the encryptionUp-
date field of this command can be used to specify a
new encryption key for the nominated logical chan-
nel. An attacker could forge a message instruct-
ing an encryption update, forcing one terminal to
switch to a new key without the other’s knowledge.
The receiver will not be able to decrypt the stream
correctly resulting in a denial of service.
5 APPLICATION LEVEL
VULNERABILITIES IN H.323
WITH H.235
Recommendation H.235 specifies authentication
and integrity security mechanisms for H.225.0 RAS
and call signalling and H.245 call control messages.
Additionally for media channels, it defines a confi-
dentiality mechanism based on symmetric encryption.
H.235 provides both network level and application-
specific security mechanisms. At the network level,
the specification states that H.323 signalling may be
secured by IPSec or the Transport Level Security
(TLS) protocol. At the application level, it defines
specific authentication and integrity mechanism to be
used within H.225.0 and H.245 protocol messages.
Application level mechanisms come in two flavours:
shared-secret based and public-key based. The au-
thentication and integrity mechanism based on shared
secrets employs a keyed message authentication code
such as HMAC-SHA1. The public-key mechanism
uses RSA-based digital signatures and certificates to
authenticate the source and integrity of protocol mes-
sages. Both methods include the choice of nonces
(time-stamps and sequence numbers) or random chal-
lenges to thwart replay attacks.
The most significant improvement obtained
through the use of the H.235 cryptographic primitives
is the reduction in the threat of vulnerabilities of the
classifications F.C1 and NF.UA. These classifications
involve the receiving host performing response
computations on unauthenticated requests. So, by
introducing authentication (as the H.235 specifica-
tions do), flooding attacks and non-flooding attacks
involving unauthenticated messages can be thwarted.
However, the authentication mechanism itself may
lead to flooding attacks of type F.C2 if it cannot
perform the authentication computations quickly
enough.
H.235 recommends the use of TLS for securing the
call control channel. It should be noted that the TLS
handshake has a behaviour of type F.C1 regardless
of whether TLS mutual authentication is performed.
This has the potential to present a critical flooding at-
tack target if the recipient cannot process the hand-
shake requests at a sufficiently high rate. Since TLS is
a computationally expensive protocol, an attacker can
commit the Gatekeeper to significant processing on
the basis of an unauthenticated request, a highly risk-
prone design. The same analysis applies when the
public-key based authentication mechanism specified
by H.235 is used at the application level. Again, there
is a significant risk of flooding attacks as an unau-
thenticated attacker can commit a target to the expen-
diture of signature verification.A delicate balance be-
tween robust authentication and speed of computation
must be achieved. The ease with which authentication
fields can be generated and validated will also have an
impact on the system’s susceptibility to vulnerabili-
ties of type F.S1 and F.S2.
The provision of integrity and/or confidentiality
services on the communication channels prevents at-
tacks which involve monitoring and or data insertion.
These will typically be non-flooding attacks which
exploit vulnerable behaviour at the application level
(for example, implementation flaws). The H.235 se-
curity services do not prevent an authenticated user
from exploiting vulnerabilities due to protocol design
flaws or implementation flaws. Of course, the attacker
could be identified trivially in this instance.
6 IMPROVING H.235
AUTHENTICATION
There are promising avenues for improving the
DoS characteristics of H.235 authentication mecha-
nisms. As has already been indicated, the efficiency
of the algorithm is a major factor when resistance to
denial of service is desired. A trade-off exists between
the certainty of the authentication, and the resistance
to DoS activity. If strong authentication, with non-
repudiation, is required then public key algorithms
may need to be considered. Similarly, when the man-
agement of share secrets such as passwords is infeasi-
ble, public-key based schemes may be needed. How-
ever, in some cases a layering of weaker but faster au-
thentication mechanisms, followed by stronger ones,
may be appropriate (Meadows, 1999).
The essential difference between the authentication
methods mentioned above is the cryptographic prim-
itives which they employ to achieve authentication.
In general a hash function can be considered to be
faster, and more compact than a symmetric encryp-
tion algorithm, which can, in turn, be considered to
be more efficient and more compact than a digital sig-
nature algorithm. Within each type of algorithm, the
concrete choice of algorithm and length of the cryp-
tographic keys results in different speeds of the prim-
itives. For example, the hash algorithm suggested in
the H.235 standard, HMAC-SHA1 is likely to be suit-
able in most instances. However, faster (and proba-
bly less secure) hash functions, such as MD5, may
be appropriate in instances where anticipated traffic
loads dictate such a requirement. The lowest level
of authentication would be a simple reachability test,
whereby the verifier checks the aliveness of the prover
by sending the prover a challenge which the prover is
expected to return back. Cookies (Aura and Nikander,
1997) could be used here to dispense the verifier from
maintaining state.
In all the authentication mechanisms defined in
H.235 there is an asymmetry between the minimal ef-
fort required of the attacker to commit the receiving
process to a greater amount of work. One general ap-
proach to address this asymmetry lies in increasing
the resources that the attacker must commit before
the receiving process commits processing or storage
resources of its own (Aura et al., 2000).
7 SUMMARY
In this paper we have identified the types of host
behaviour that may indicate a susceptibility to vari-
ous denial of service attacks. The broad categories of
flooding and non-flooding attacks allow us to classify
the behaviours which lead to these types of attack. In
each case, attacks are most likely when the host re-
ceiving a message performs actions without authenti-
cating it. However authentication mechanisms must
be carefully designed so as not introduce new vulner-
abilities themselves.
Network level vulnerabilities present a range of se-
rious threats to VoIP system availability. Flooding
attacks are particularly potent due to the source ad-
dress spoofing vulnerability in IPv4. Source spoofing
in private networks can be addressed in a number of
ways including careful IP network design combined
with filtering, and providing trusted MAC address to
IP address binding. Where this binding is present,
flooding attacks may be filtered at the transport layer,
potentially the most efficient point to perform filter-
ing. Transport layer filtering combined with intrusion
detection is proposed as an area of future research.
This approach allows H.323 entities to be self defend-
ing against both network and application layer flood-
ing attacks.
Importantly, this paper has also identified vulnera-
bilities in application level protocol messages that are
exchanged between H.323 entities. We have investi-
gated the problems associated with the weak or non-
existent authentication mechanisms present in unse-
cured H.323 implementations. We have also de-
scribed how the security mechanisms specified in the
H.235 standard (optionally implemented by H.323
entities) assist in preventing DoS activities which rely
on weak or non-existent authentication. These au-
thentication mechanisms specified in H.235, however,
introduce new vulnerabilities. We have discussed
such vulnerabilities as well as promising research di-
rections that may help in mitigating them.
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